The courts of appeal published several opinions relating to anti-SLAPP motions focusing both on the procedural aspects of such motions, and the merits, especially relating to whether the underlying conduct constitutes protected activity.

Court of Appeal holds that a defendant was not required to comply with Rule of Court 3.1322 (standards for motions to strike) for its anti-SLAPP motion

In Miszkewycz v. County of Placer a former interim Placer County District Attorney filed a lawsuit against the County of Placer (“County”) for demoting her, allegedly in retaliation for working with investigators looking into allegations of misconduct by a member of the county board. Plaintiff had worked for the County since 2006, when she was hired as a deputy district attorney. In 2018, she had been promoted to the position of assistant district attorney, considered a leadership position within the agency. In December 2019, the then-district attorney retired and was replaced by Charles Wilson. Within days, Wilson read plaintiff a text message he had received, allegedly from the wife of a Placer County Board member, which plaintiff said was a “quid pro quo” and potential public corruption. A complaint was then filed with the Fair Practices Political Commission. Wilson was then placed on administrative leave, and Miszkewycz became interim D.A. Plaintiff then inquired with the California Attorney General’s office concerning her ethical abilities to both investigate the complaint and serve as D.A. The Attorney General’s office then launched an investigation, and plaintiff cooperated with the investigation, informing investigators of the existence of the alleged quid pro quo text message. In April 2020, the county appointed a new D.A., Morgan Gire. In July 2020, plaintiff was demoted to the position of senior deputy district attorney, removing her from leadership within the office and costing her $40,000 a year in salary.

In response to plaintiff’s lawsuit, the County filed an anti-SLAPP motion arguing that plaintiff could not sue over the demotion, because the decision “was connected to an official proceeding because a section of the County Code authorized her demotion.” The County further argued plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim should fail because it was allegedly connected to the same public proceedings, which the county argued should be considered speech. The trial court denied the motion, and County appealed.

The Court of Appeal affirmed finding that County’s arguments amounted to a misreading of California Supreme Court decisions addressing when official actions can be considered SLAPP-shielded speech, rather than litigable decisions. In this case, Court said plaintiff is not suing over statements made against her by county officials, but rather over the County’s adverse employment actions against her.

Court of Appeal holds that defendant’s anti-SLAPP motion should not have been granted based on litigation privilege where plaintiff’s claims were based on violations of the Rosenthal Act and the litigation privilege did not apply

In Moten v. Transworld Systems Inc. Moten had taken out a student loan which she later defaulted on, leading to Transworld, a debt collection company, servicing the loan. Transworld filed a debt collection action against Moten on behalf of National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2007-3 (“NCSLT 2007-3”), to whom the loan had been assigned. Moten filed a class action lawsuit against Transworld, alleging that it did not have a valid legal claim as it had manufactured documents to prove ownership of the loan by NCSLT 2007-3. She claimed that these deceptive practices violated the Robbins-Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act and the Federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, as well as Unfair Competition and Unlawful Business Acts and Practices.

The trial court granted Transworld’s anti-SLAPP motion, which led to Moten’s appeal.

The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s decision, ruling that the trial court erred in applying the litigation privilege to Moten’s claims. The Court remanded the case back to the trial court to determine whether Moten has a probability of prevailing on her claims and to consider the public interest exception of the anti-SLAPP statute, Code of Civil Procedure section 425.17.

Court of Appeal holds that a company’s press releases met the commercial speech exemption; therefore, the trial court’s order granting defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion was improper

In BioCorRx, Inc. v. VDM Biochemicals, Inc. BioCorRx, Inc. (BCR”), a publicly traded company engaged in providing addiction treatment services and related medication, was involved in a dispute with VDM Biochemicals, Inc. (“VDM”), a company specializing in chemical synthesis and distribution. The dispute arose from a business relationship in which BCR intended to partner with VDM to develop and commercialize a compound for treating opioid overdose, known as VDM-001. BCR issued several press releases, allegedly making misrepresentations and improperly disclosing confidential information about the development of VDM-001. VDM filed a cross-complaint against BCR and its president, Brady Granier, for breach of contract, fraud, and violation of trade secrets among other claims. In response, BCR and Granier filed a motion to strike the allegations based on the anti-SLAPP statute, arguing that the press releases were protected speech under the statute. The trial court granted the motion as to the press releases.

The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the press releases fell within the commercial speech exemption of the anti-SLAPP statute, as they were representations about BCR’s business operations made to promote its goods and services to investors. As such, these statements were not protected by the anti-SLAPP statute.

Court of Appeal holds that trial court erred in granting defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion and awarding attorney’s fees since not all of defendants’ conduct alleged in the complaint was protected

Williams v. Doctors Medical Center of Modesto involved a dispute between Dr. R. Michael Williams (“Williams”), a board-certified oncologist, and several defendants, including Doctors Medical Center of Modesto (“DMCM”) and various associated individuals. After a deterioration in their professional relationship, Williams alleged that the defendants acted to limit his medical practice and restrict his hospital privileges, affecting his ability to treat patients. Williams filed multiple lawsuits against the defendants, the second of which is the subject of this appellate opinion.

The trial court granted two anti-SLAPP motions in favor of the defendants, finding that Williams’ claims arose from defendants’ protected activity and that Williams failed to establish a probability of prevailing on his claims. The court also awarded the defendants their attorney fees. Williams appealed both the granting of the anti-SLAPP motions and the awards of attorney fees.

The Court of Appeal reversed both the granting of the anti-SLAPP motions and the award of attorney fees, finding that the trial court erred in its application of the anti-SLAPP statute. The Court distinguished between the factual allegations that form the basis of Williams’ claims and the defendants’ protected activities, concluding that not all of the claims in the complaint arose from protected activity. As such, not all of Williams’ claims were subject to the anti-SLAPP statute and the defendants were not entitled to attorney fees.

Court of Appeal holds that a letter from attorney containing alleged misrepresentations was not protected prelitigation conduct because it constituted a threat to avoid litigation, not in anticipation of litigation

In Medallion Film LLC v. Loeb & Loeb LLP plaintiffs Medallion Film LLC and Pelican Point Capital Partners (“Plaintiffs”) entered into a consulting fee agreement with Clarius Capital Group (“Clarius”), managed by William Sadleir (“Sadleir”). The agreement stipulated that Plaintiffs would assist Clarius in obtaining funding for film projects, and Clarius would pay them a portion of any funding obtained. Thereafter, Sadleir dissolved Clarius and its affiliate and subsidiary entities in 2015 and formed a new set of corporate entities under the name Aviron with the assistance of the law firm Loeb & Loeb (“Loeb”).

The plaintiffs allege that Sadleir controlled both the Clarius and Aviron entities and transferred Clarius’s assets to the Aviron entities. Aviron later obtained a loan for its film projects from BlackRock which, in an email, Plaintiffs claimed they were entitled to a portion of the proceeds under their agreement with Clarius. In response to the email, Given, an attorney at Loeb, wrote a letter denying that Aviron and Clarius have no legal relationship. The letter also threatened that any further communication by Plaintiffs to BlackRock regarding will be considered by Aviron to constitute tortious interference.

The Plaintiffs sued Loeb alleging causes of action for fraudulent misrepresentation, deceit by concealment, negligent misrepresentation, aiding and abetting fraud, and violating California Business and Professions Code section 17200. Loeb filed a special motion to strike the first amended complaint as a strategic lawsuit against public participation under section 425.16 claiming that Plaintiff’s claims were all based on Given’s letter which was sent in anticipation of litigation and thus protected. The trial court granted the special motion to strike.

The Court of Appeal reversed the order granting the special motion to strike finding that “Given’s bombastic and disproportionate response to an email not even directed to his client is not a communication made in good faith and serious contemplation of litigation but an attempt to dissuade the plaintiffs from making any further inquiries.” As such, Given’s letter was not protected by the anti-SLAPP statute.

In affirming denial of anti-SLAPP motion by a charitable institution, Court of Appeal holds that plaintiff’s fraud claims against the charitable institution did not arise from protected speech (sermon inspiring donation), but rather from alleged misconduct (absconding with donation) that occurred after the charitable institution encouraged plaintiff to make a charitable donation

In Gazal v. Echeverry plaintiff, Joseph Gazal, donated over $1 million to purchase a car and a home for a destitute family. He was inspired to make this donation after hearing a homily delivered by defendant Carlos Echeverry, a deacon at his church. Gazal brought a lawsuit against Echeverry and his wife, Jessica Echeverry, as well as SOFESA, Inc., a nonprofit founded and led by Jessica Echeverry. Gazal claimed he was deceived into believing the car and house would be purchased for and titled to the destitute family, when in fact they were bought and titled to SOFESA.

The defendants filed a special motion to strike the complaint under the anti-SLAPP statute asserting that the homily and following conversations were protected speech. The trial court denied the motion, finding that the complaint did not rest on protected speech, but rather on private conduct and speech not directed at a wide public audience. Additionally, the court found that the causes of action arose from further communications that took place weeks after the homily.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's decision. The Court held that while the homily could be considered protected speech, the plaintiff’s claims did not arise from the homily but rather from the alleged misconduct that occurred after its delivery. The Court also found that the private discussions following the homily did not qualify for anti-SLAPP protection as they did not contribute to a public conversation on the issue of homelessness.

Court of Appeal holds that homeowners’ statements to their HOA were not made in connection with a public issue of public interest because they were private “name-calling” made to only a handful of people

Dubac v. Itkoff involved a dispute between neighbors in a six-unit condominium building. Robert Dubac, the plaintiff, and Sandra Itkoff and Jonathan Diamond, the defendants, were owners of units in the same building. The defendants made several statements about Dubac, accusing him of various wrongdoings, including discrimination, self-dealing, acting in bad faith, racism, and harassment of their daughter. These statements were made through emails and oral communications to other residents of the building, the homeowners association, and an insurance carrier.

Dubac sued Itkoff and Diamond for defamation, infliction of emotional distress, interference with economic advantage, and civil harassment. In response, the defendants filed a special motion to strike under the anti-SLAPP statute, arguing that their statements were made in connection with a public issue. The trial court denied most of the motion, ruling that the majority of the statements did not meet the first prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis, which required a showing that the statements were connected to a public issue. Defendants appealed.

The Court of Appeal affirmed concluding that the dispute did not involve a public issue or an issue of public interest. The Court reasoned that the dispute was essentially a private feud between neighbors and did not contribute to public discussion of public issues. The Court also noted that the audience for the defendants’ statements was small and confined to the building’s residents and associated parties, further indicating that the matter was not of public interest.

Court of Appeal holds that trial court erroneously denied defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion, where plaintiff’s claims about allegedly stolen television series idea arose from defendants’ protected activity

In Norman v. Ross plaintiff Hayley Marie Norman filed a complaint alleging that her idea for a television series was stolen by defendants Tracee Ellis Ross, Artists First, Kenya Barris, Brian Dobbins, Touchstone Productions dba ABC Studios (“ABC”), and Big Breakfast LLC (collectively “Defendants”). Norman alleged her idea for a series—which she intended to star in, write for, and produce—was turned into a sitcom by Defendants without her permission or involvement. Defendants contended the sitcom, a spinoff of an existing television series, was not based on Norman’s ideas.

Norman filed a complaint alleging breach of implied-in-fact contract, breach of confidence, promissory estoppel, and other claims. The Defendants filed special motions to strike under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, the anti-SLAPP statute. The trial court granted the motions in full as to defendants Barris, Dobbins, and ABC; the court denied the motions in part as to Ross and Artists First. The parties cross-appealed the court’s order.

The Court of Appeal held that all of Norman’s claims arise from protected activity. Specifically, Norman’s claims rest upon communications about developing the television show which the Court found protected activity. The Court further found that Defendants met the second prong of the anti-SLAPP motion: plaintiff did not establish a probability of success on her causes of action.

Court of Appeal affirms that a domestic violence restraining order should not be struck by anti-SLAPP statute even though some of party’s activity was protected because underlying restraining order petition had requisite minimal merit

Bassi v. Bassi involved a dispute between ex-spouses Robert Bassi and Susan Bassi. After their divorce, Susan sent a series of e-mails to Robert which he claimed were harassing and disturbed his peace. These e-mails were related to Susan’s intent to file a federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”) action against Robert and others. In response, Robert filed a petition for a domestic violence restraining order (“DVRO”) against Susan. Susan then filed an anti-SLAPP (motion, arguing that her e-mails were protected free speech and litigation correspondence. The trial court denied Susan’s anti-SLAPP motion, finding that several of the e-mails were not privileged or protected speech, and that Robert had demonstrated a likelihood of prevailing on the merits of his DVRO petition. Susan appealed.

The Court of Appeal affirmed finding that while some of Susan’s e-mails were protected under the anti-SLAPP statute, others were not. The Court also found that Robert had made a prima facie showing of facts sufficient to sustain a favorable result on his DVRO petition if the facts he alleged were substantiated. Therefore, Robert’s claim under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act had at least the requisite minimal merit to avoid being stricken as a SLAPP.

Ninth Circuit holds that defendant’s anti-SLAPP motion was properly denied because a database containing professional contact information did not meet the requirements to overcome the public interest exemption

In Batis v. Dun & Bradstreet Holdings, Inc. Odette R. Batis brought a class action lawsuit against Dun & Bradstreet Holdings, Inc. (“D&B”), challenging the use of her name and contact information in the free trial for the D&B Hoovers database. Batis alleged that the use of that information without her permission violated her right of publicity under California law. D&B filed an anti-SLAPP motion arguing that Batis’ claims “arise from D&B’s acts in furtherance of the right of free speech.” The district court denied the motion on the merits, holding that D&B had “failed to make a threshold showing that Batis’ claims arise from protected activity.” D&B appealed.

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order denying the anti-SLAPP motion on the grounds that Batis’ lawsuit is exempt from anti-SLAPP motions under California law. The anti-SLAPP statute does not apply to any lawsuits brought “solely in the public interest or on behalf of the general public.” (Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.17(b).) The Court held that since Batis’ lawsuit seeks to enforce an important right under California law and she does not seek any relief different from the rest of the class, her lawsuit falls within that exemption.

Court of Appeal holds that, despite pending parallel litigation, refusal to respond to employee record requests under the Labor Code was not protected conduct subject to the provisions of the anti-SLAPP statute

In Taylor v. Tesla, Inc. four former Tesla employees, Sharonda Taylor, Shaka Green, Tatianna Smith, and Zenobia Milligan, requested personnel records from Tesla under the California Labor Code. These individuals are also part of a class action lawsuit, Vaughn v. Tesla, which alleges racial discrimination and harassment at Tesla’s Fremont plant. Despite the requests, Tesla did not provide the requested records, citing a stay in the Vaughn case due to an ongoing appeal. The plaintiffs then filed a Private Attorneys General Act (“PAGA”) action against Tesla for failing to comply with the Labor Code. Tesla filed an anti-SLAPP motion on the grounds that the PAGA claims arose from protected petitioning activity related to the Vaughn case. The trial court denied the motion finding that the plaintiffs’ requests for personnel records were independent of the Vaughn litigation and were merely an exercise of their statutory rights under the Labor Code. Tesla appealed.

The Court of Appeal affirmed holding that Tesla’s refusal to provide the requested records did not constitute protected activity under the anti-SLAPP statute. The Court distinguished this case from Crossroads Investors, L.P. v. Federal National Mortgage Assn., noting that the plaintiffs’ PAGA claims did not rely on any “written or oral statement or writing” by Tesla. The Court also found that Tesla's conduct did not meet the criteria for protection under the anti-SLAPP statute’s “catchall” provision, as it did not contribute to any public issue or debate.

Court of Appeal affirms granting of anti-SLAPP motion to strike where plaintiff surgeon failed to demonstrate probability of prevailing because hospital’s adverse actions were shielded by the litigation and common interest privileges

In Dignity Health v. Mounts Dignity Health, operating as French Hospital Medical Center, filed a complaint against orthopedic surgeon Troy I. Mounts, M.D., and his corporation to recover an advance paid under their Physician Recruitment Agreement. Mounts filed a cross-complaint alleging retaliation for his complaints about patient care quality, interference with his economic opportunities, and unlawful business practices. Dignity responded with an anti-SLAPP motion to strike the cross-complaint, which the trial court initially denied. The court of appeal reversed this decision and remanded the case for further consideration.

On remand, the trial court concluded that Mounts had not demonstrated a probability of prevailing on his claims. The court found that Dignity’s actions were protected by the litigation privilege, the common interest privilege, and were barred by the statute of limitations. Consequently, the court granted Dignity’s motion to strike the cross-complaint and ordered Mounts to pay Dignity’s attorney fees and costs. Mounts appealed.

The Court of Appeal affirmed holding that all of Mounts’ claims were based on conduct protected by the litigation privilege (Civil Code § 47(b)) and the common interest privilege (Civil Code § 47(c)). The Court also found that Dignity’s actions were immune under federal law (42 U.S.C. § 11137) and that some claims were barred by the statute of limitations.

Court of Appeal holds that public interest exemption to anti-SLAPP statute did not apply because no public interest was advanced by suing individual defendants for relief that only defendant Water District could provide

Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Assn. v. Powell involved a dispute between a taxpayers’ association (“Jarvis”) and a water district over the imposition of groundwater replenishment charges. Jarvis alleged that the water district’s charges violated constitutional provisions and unfairly benefited large agricultural businesses. Jarvis filed a petition for a writ of mandate against the water district and its board members and general manager to stop the collection of these charges and to vacate the resolutions imposing them. It also claimed conversion, civil conspiracy, aiding and abetting, and violations of the Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”) against the water district’s board members, general manager, and consulting firms.

The individual defendants filed an anti-SLAPP motion which sought to strike several causes of action on the grounds that they arose from protected activities. The trial court denied the motion finding that the public interest exemption to the anti-SLAPP statute applied. The court also awarded over $180,000 in attorney’s fees to the plaintiffs, deeming the anti-SLAPP motion frivolous.

The Court of Appeal reversed holding that the public interest exemption did not apply because the relief sought could only be provided by the water district, not the individual defendants. The Court found that the anti-SLAPP motion should have been granted for most causes of action, except for conversion and the writ of mandate against the general manager. Consequently, the fee award was reversed.

Court of Appeal holds that an employee’s letter to human resources complaining of workplace harassment was privileged and therefore granted employee’s anti-SLAPP motion in response to cross-complaint by her employer for libel

In Osborne v. Pleasanton Automotive Co. Eva Osborne sued Pleasanton Automotive Company, LOP Automotive Company LP, HAG Automotive Investments LP, and Bob Slap (“Slap”), alleging workplace misconduct including discrimination, retaliation, harassment, and wage violations. Osborne, who worked as Slap’s executive assistant, claimed Slap required her to perform personal tasks without proper compensation. In response, Slap filed a cross-complaint against Osborne alleging libel, slander, and other claims based on statements Osborne made in a letter to the employer’s HR director. The letter described at length instances of Slap’s alleged misconduct, accused him of repeatedly making inappropriate and demeaning requests of Osborne, stated he refused to allow her to log all of her time and repeatedly failed to ensure she was paid for all the work he asked her to do.

Osborne filed an anti-SLAPP motion as to Slap’s cross-complaint. The trial court granted the motion concluding that Osborne’s statements to HR were protected activity made in anticipation of litigation and were privileged under Civil Code section 47. The court found that Slap could not show his claims had minimal merit because the statements were privileged and he failed to demonstrate malice. Slap appealed.

The Court of Appeal affirmed holding that Osborne’s statements were protected under the anti-SLAPP statute and that the litigation privilege barred Slap’s claims. The Court found that Osborne’s letter to HR was sent in good faith contemplation of litigation, supported by her retention of counsel and subsequent legal actions.

Court of Appeal holds that anti-SLAPP statute mandated granting of attorney’s fees to the prevailing party where the motion was frivolous, as no reasonable attorney would conclude that plaintiff’s petition sought to impose liability based on any protected activity

In Littlefield v. Littlefield Allison Littlefield filed a verified petition against her brothers, Scott and David Littlefield, and her aunt, Denise Sobel, who are co-trustees of The Pony Tracks Ranch Trust which owns a ranch. The petition sought their removal as co-trustees, alleging breaches of fiduciary duty and the Trust, and requested declaratory and injunctive relief. Allison claimed that the defendants misused Trust funds, concealed information, converted her personal property, restricted her use of the ranch, and failed to address misconduct by an employee, Stacey Limbada, who allegedly harassed Allison and her husband.

Defendants filed an anti-SLAPP motion which was denied by the trial court on the grounds that defendants failed to show that Allison’s petition arose from protected activity. The court also denied Allison's request for attorney’s fees, finding that the motion was not frivolous or solely intended to cause unnecessary delay. Defendants appealed.

The Court of Appeal affirmed agreeing that defendants did not meet their burden of showing that the petition was based on protected activity. The Court noted that the defendants’ motion failed to identify specific allegations of protected activity and improperly sought to strike the entire petition or all causes of action without distinguishing between protected and unprotected conduct.

However, the Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s denial of Allison's request for attorney’s fees finding that the anti-SLAPP motion was frivolous. The Court held that any reasonable attorney would agree that the motion was totally devoid of merit, as it did not demonstrate that the petition sought to impose liability based on protected activity.

Court of Appeal holds that a request for monetary relief by debt collection agencies did not preclude the public interest exception to California’s anti-SLAPP statute

In Lindsay v. Patenaude & Felix Aleksia Lindsay filed a class action complaint against Patenaude & Felix, APC (“Patenaude”) and Transworld Systems Inc. (“Transworld”), alleging unfair debt collection practices. Lindsay had defaulted on $60,000 in student loans, and after receiving incomplete and inaccurate information from Transworld, Patenaude initiated two debt collection lawsuits against her. Lindsay later discovered that both entities had a history of unethical collection practices, leading to actions by various regulatory bodies. After the lawsuits against her were dismissed, Lindsay received another demand for payment and subsequently filed the class action complaint. Defendants filed an anti-SLAPP motion.

The trial court granted the anti-SLAPP motion and struck Lindsay’s complaint, ruling that the public interest exception did not apply. Lindsay argued that the trial court erred in this decision. The trial court concluded that although the three conditions of the public interest exception were met, the action was not brought solely in the public interest because Lindsay sought damages. Lindsay appealed.

The Court of Appeal reversed holding that the action was brought solely in the public interest or on behalf of the general public, as the relief sought by Lindsay was identical to that sought for the plaintiff class. The Court also found that seeking damages did not preclude the application of the public interest exception. The Court concluded that the action met all three conditions of the public interest exception: (1) it did not seek greater or different relief, (2) it would enforce an important right affecting the public interest and confer a significant benefit, and (3) private enforcement was necessary and placed a disproportionate financial burden on Lindsay.

Court of Appeal holds that because the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act allows consumers wrongly sued over a debt to pursue a claim against the debt collector, a debt collector’s anti-SLAPP motion against a mistakenly-identified consumer should have been denied

In LVNV Funding v. Rodriguez LVNV Funding, LLC (“LVNV”) filed a debt collection lawsuit against Yolanda Rodriguez (“Rodriguez”). Rodriguez cross-complained, alleging identity theft and violations of the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) and the California Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“Rosenthal Act”). It was revealed that LVNV had sued the wrong person, as the debt was incurred by a different Yolanda Rodriguez with a different date of birth and Social Security number. As a result, LVNV dismissed its suit, but Rodriguez continued with her cross-claim, arguing that the FDCPA and Rosenthal Acts are strict liability statutes that penalize false or misleading debt collection actions unless they fit within a narrow “bona fide error” defense.

LVNV filed an anti-SLAPP motion which the trial court granted concluding that Rodriguez could not establish a probability of prevailing on the merits because there was nothing false, deceptive, or misleading about the debt collection action. The court found that even the “least sophisticated debtor” would have recognized the address on the documentation was not hers, and there was “nothing inherently false about the complaint” merely because it was served on the wrong Yolanda Rodriguez. Rodriguez appealed.

The Court of Appeal reversed holding that the FDCPA creates a strict liability cause of action for attempts to collect a debt that misrepresent or falsely present the “character” or “amount” of a debt owed, including cases of mistaken identity. The Court found that Rodriguez’s claims had merit (albeit minimal), satisfying the second prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis.